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The issues surrounding the Caesar problem are assumed to be inert as far as ongoing mathe-
matics is concerned. This paper aims to correct this impression by spelling out the ways that,
in their historical context, Frege’s remarks would have had considerable resonance with work
that other mathematicians such as Riemann and Dedekind were doing. The search for presen-
tation-independent characterizations of objects and global definitions was seen as bound up with
fundamental methodological questions in complex analysis and number theory.
 
In this paper I’ll describe some of the work done in Frege’s mathematical envi-
ronment (in the areas of mathematics he worked, in the styles he did his work in)
forming the background against which we can see the Caesar problem. Because
we have underestimated what a rich field mathematics was at the time, we’ve
underestimated how natural – to many mathematicians of the time – some of
Frege’s concerns would seem (though often he pushed them a step or two farther





 in ways that connect to the Caesar problem – the
emphasis on global definitions rather than partial ones, defining objects in a
representation-independent way, the importance of being able to identify objects
in diverse ways and the connection of that to extending knowledge, the general
emphasis on the importance of fruitful concepts – that would have reverberated
in very specific ways with Frege’s mathematical readers. Furthermore, the themes
that would have echoed for Frege’s mathematical readers were so salient that it




, Frege wasn’t aware of the allusions
that his mathematically informed readers could be expected to infer. This will help
bring out that even in what appear to be Frege’s most ‘philosophical’ moments,
there is far more going on than meets the eye. In fact, there is so much going on
behind the curtain that I am not going to cover all aspects of the mathematical
environment that are relevant to some aspect of Frege’s treatment of the Caesar
problem. I’ll spell out enough of the background to illustrate how it can bring out
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There is a widespread view, which has even been defended in print, that
Frege’s foundational work is mathematically inert: that it is disengaged from the
mathematics around him and is not in the same spirit. Certainly this is taken to
be true of his concern for explicitly presenting numbers as objects, so that the
definition supports the conclusion that Julius Caesar is not a number. It is not –
we are inclined to suppose – the sort of thing that mathematicians regard as useful;
and to be sure it has not proven to be of much mathematical use. This point is not
just a contemporary novelty: we seem to find it in the opinion of the young
Husserl, fresh from his Weierstrass-inspired PhD on the calculus of variations,








 And certainly if we
are to judge by his non-foundational work, Frege was a decent but certainly not




 He was astute at analyzing and laying out
the logical structure of innovations in mainstream practice that others had dem-
onstrated to be rich and important, but he was not especially gifted at producing




But in contrast to our contemporary preconceptions, Frege thought he was
doing something that would have an impact on non-foundational practice. In his




 he writes of his ‘further hope’
that logically clarifying the fine structure of the simple examples will allow the
clarified concepts to be carried over to more intricate questions.
 
The aim of proof is, in fact, not merely to place the truth of a proposition beyond
all doubt, but also to afford us insight into the dependence of truths upon one
another. . . . But there may even be reason for a further hope: if, by examining the
simplest cases, we can bring to light what mankind has there done by instinct, and









By ‘mainstream’ or ‘non–foundational’ mathematics I mean to refer to Frege’s exten-
sive work in those areas of mathematics outside logic and foundations, principally complex
analysis and geometry. I am using the label only for orientation, and I assume that readers will





A lovely paper (Gronau 1997) has convinced me that this observation needs one




 apparently shows a talent for unearthing novelties that were, in hindsight,
quite promising. (The importance of these novelties was rediscovered and developed by others
much later, not by Frege.) Gronau suggests plausibly that much of [MCE] is potentially quite
important, though Frege never returned to the iteration-theoretic dimensions of this work.
(Though nearly all that I know about iteration theory is what I learned from Gronau’s paper, so
I am no position to give an expert assessment.)
There is, in fact, a distant affinity between the iterative methods Frege studied and a
technique introduced by his erstwhile student Heinrich Liebmann in Liebmann 1918, for solving
families of partial differential equations. This may represent one of the rare points at which the
influence of Frege’s non–foundational work showed itself in subsequent mathematics.
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arrive at general methods for forming concepts and establishing principles which
will be applicable also in more complicated cases? ([FA] 2; see References for key
to bracketed Frege references in text).
 
Frege says that clarifying simple and basic cases might illuminate more complex
ones. This ‘further hope’ seems to be that through foundational analysis of ele-
mentary cases like the concept of number, problem-solving in more complicated
contexts will be facilitated. That is, Frege marks out as one of his objectives that





echoed elsewhere, when he discusses the criterion for judging a concept especially
worth logical attention:
 
All these concepts have been developed in science and have proved their fruitfulness.
For this reason what we may discover in them has a far higher claim on our attention
than anything that our everyday trains of thought might offer. For fruitfulness is the
acid test of concepts, and the scientific workshop is logic’s true field of observation
([BLC] 33).
 
The ‘further hope’ was not unreasonable in principle. Facilitating results at the
frontiers of nonfoundational mathematics by clarifying the foundations of simple
concepts did happen at the time. To consider just one example we’ll revisit in
section 3, in work that Frege was sure to have been familiar with at least in outline,





mann’s theory of algebraic functions of one variable in what we would now call
algebraic terms. This was an astonishing triumph of logical analysis (broadly
understood) since it had as one key the fine structure of factorization revealed by
Dedekind’s generalized notion of division among numbers, carried over to the
more intricate case of algebraic functions. This generalized notion of division had
at its core Dedekind’s treatment of ideals, which we’ll consider in section 3. This
was a triumph in other ways that matter to Frege as well. In particular, it exploited
the refined concepts of number and division to rework, without any appeal to
geometric intuition, concepts and theorems at the ‘cutting edge’ of ongoing
research that a reasonable person could have thought at the time were essentially
geometric, relying crucially on intuition.
Frege was working during a time that was especially exciting in mathematics,
during which many of the basic assumptions about the nature of the discipline









by the context of the quote. In the section in which it occurs, §2, Frege is explicitly discussing




 section by drawing
an explicit contrast between philosophical motives and what went before: ‘Philosophical motives
too have prompted me to inquiries of this kind’ ([FA] 3) (He makes this distinction of motives
also in the annotated table of contents.) That Frege explicitly marks out this distinction in his
motives at this point was, I believe, first pointed out in Benacerraf 1981.
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pick up on allusions and borrowed clichés that would have been evident to his





resonated with his mathematical readers in predictable ways, and Frege should be
expected to have written with an awareness of how his words would strike his
audience – or at least the mathematically informed among them. In particular,
we’ll see that there are surprisingly many hidden dimensions to Frege’s words.
Among the charged topics were Frege’s emphasis on fruitfulness, his search for
global definitions, and his search for the presentation – independent introduction
of an object in a way that permits a multifaceted approach to it, with the suggestion
that such presentations have a connection to objectivity and extensions of knowl-
edge. I should warn the reader in advance that the balance between discussion of
specific Fregean passages and details of the mathematical background tilts to the
latter. I will not discuss all of the aspects of the Caesar problem; indeed I won’t
even discuss all those aspects of Frege’s discussion of the Caesar problem that
have parallels in Frege’s mathematical environment. I’ll just take up a few pas-
sages and dialectical moves, to illustrate how much currently forgotten informa-
tion and background would have brought to life even single turns of phrase for
Frege’s readers.
To help make plausible the suggestion that the mathematical background
influenced Frege as I’m suggesting it did, I’ll concentrate on the way that Dede-
kind was moved to carry out a maneuver similar to the one Frege exhibits in
response to the Caesar problem. This strategy should not be taken as suggesting
that Frege and Dedekind were alike in all respects: clearly there are important
differences. Rather the point is to combat an entrenched stereotype. Despite what
the context may suggest about how to read various passages where Frege writes
in a way that any mathematician of the time would regard as highly charged, there
might be resistance based on an armchair sense that mathematicians simply don’t
think that way about the relation between foundations and ongoing practice.
Dedekind’s words and practice will undercut that resistance, by showing that at
that time, one mathematician with affinities to Frege not only thought that way,
but said so explicitly and acted on those thoughts in detail to contribute to
revolutionary nonfoundational work.
 
1. Definition-independence of the presentation of objects and the fruitfulness 
of concepts
 
Even those who have thought long and hard about the Caesar problem can find
themselves with occasional nagging doubts as to just what the problem is, and
why it should have the importance to Frege that it does. Even when we figure out
what the problem is supposed to be, many of the things Frege says about it don’t
seem to ring just right. How does this have anything to do with any idea of
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‘self-subsistence’ which objects are taken to have? How do Frege’s remarks to
the effect that an independent mode of presentation is needed to secure more than
unfruitful inferences fit in?
A clear statement of the connection among some of the ideas in the cluster




 §67. The remarks come in response to a
natural question that might be asked in connection to the Caesar objection: why




 by the definition
count as numbers (or in this case directions), and nothing else does? Frege’s
response ties the definition-independence of the presentation of objects to the
potential for increasing knowledge through deductive reasoning.
 
§67 If we were to try saying: q is a direction if it is introduced by means of the
definition set out above, then we should be 
 
treating the way in which the object q
is introduced as a property of q, which it is not . . . 
 
[and a further unacceptable
consequence would be that:] All identities would then amount simply to this, that
whatever is given to us in the same way is to be reckoned as the same. 
 
This, however,
is a principle so obvious and so unfruitful as not to be worth stating. We could not,
in fact, draw from it any conclusion which was not the same as one of our premises.
 
Why is it, after all, that we are able to make use of identities with such significant
results in such diverse fields? Surely it is rather because we are able to recognize
something as the same again even though it is given in a different way ([FA] 78–79
emphasis mine).
 
We should recall that although today mathematics has advanced to the point that
the introduction of objects with reference to some equivalence relation is old hat,
to Frege it was a relatively novel device for defining direction (orientation, etc.);
Frege would have seen himself as exploring a new technique whose potential
wasn’t fully charted. Outside of geometry a high profile use of a cognate maneuver
was exploited in Dedekind’s reconstruction of Kummer’s theory of ideal numbers.
We’ll consider that, and the motivations for it, in 3). First let’s remind ourselves
of how Frege regards the connection between his conception of fruitful mathe-




 conception of ‘extending knowledge’.




 §64 that in the Hume principle ‘we carve up the
content in a new way and this yields us a new concept (75).’ These metaphors of




 as well as in other Fregean
writings) to support the suggestion that logical inferences exploiting the truly
‘fruitful definitions’ (sometimes ‘fruitful concepts’) actually extend knowledge.
In Frege’s most vivid expression of the point, he writes:
 
[Kant] seems to think of concepts as defined by giving a simple list of characteristics
in no special order; but of all ways of forming concepts, that is one of the least
fruitful. If we look through the definitions given in the course of this book, we shall
scarcely find one that is of this description. The same is true of the really fruitful
definitions in mathematics, such as that of the continuity of a function. What we
find in these is not a simple list of characteristics; every element is intimately, I
might almost say organically, connected with the others ([FA] 100).
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Frege has other remarks scattered around his writings in which he indicates further
the kind of advantages that he takes to be involved in the definitions he calls
‘fruitful’. In characterizing his reasons for pushing more deeply than usual into
logical foundations, he notes a cluster of desiderata for definitions that animate
mathematical practice, including ‘[revealing] connections between matters appar-
ently remote from one another’ and ‘leading to an advance in order and regularity’.
Though he regards these as insufficient unless supplemented by logical founda-
tions, he takes them to tend in a general way toward getting things right:
 
If a definition shows itself tractable when used in proofs, if no contradictions are
anywhere encountered, and if connections are revealed between matters apparently
remote from one another, this leading to an advance in order and regularity, it is
usual to regard the definition as sufficiently established, and few questions are asked
as to its logical justification. This procedure has at least the advantage that it makes
it difficult to miss the mark altogether. I agree that definitions must show their
worth by their fruitfulness: it must be possible to use them for constructing
proofs. . . . [Though by] these methods we shall, at bottom, never have achieved






There are two sides to Frege’s conception of fruitfulness of concepts that we
should note. First, there is his informal and pre-theoretic view that some concepts
and definitions (and, by extension, some theories and frameworks) better facilitate
important new discoveries. This is, of course, hardly a controversial view, but what
gives it bite here is the second aspect: Frege regards it as an advantage of his
system, and describes it as a constraint on an adequate foundation of mathematics,
that it should support a representation of ‘the truly fruitful concepts’. This is




, but it is
most explicit in the unpublished essay [BLC]. In particular, as noted above, in
that essay Frege emphasizes that he regards his foundational effort as bound to
address the concepts that are ‘most fruitful’ as revealed in ‘scientific workshops:
logic’s true field of observation’.
The emphasis on logical decomposition in the ‘Boole’s Logical Calculus . . .’
paper as a whole fits with the idea of fruitfulness for a particularly compelling
dialectical reason. Frege points out that the concepts he can represent and his critic





particular cases Frege considers are crucial distinctions in analysis (including
formulations of the notions of uniform convergence and continuity for functions)
plus notions like ‘prime factor’ and others concepts relating to the divisibility and
factorization of natural numbers. In my paper Tappenden 1995a I studied the









When I wrote Tappenden 1995a my explorations into Frege’s mathematical environ-
ment were still in their infancy, and though I was concerned in that paper to argue that Frege’s 
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Here too, Frege’s remarks about fruitfulness and scientific importance were being
borne out by well-known events contemporaneous with his logical research.
The areas of mathematics where Frege worked (here we’ll consider complex
analysis) especially in the style in which Frege was immersed (Riemann’s) were
in a period of remarkable turbulence. Questions of the proper formulations of
problems and the proper choice of basic concepts, attempts to find the ‘best’ proof
methods and disputes over the criteria of ‘bestness’, and other such broadly
methodological topics were particularly salient. Not only were these issues
implicit in the ongoing research programs of the mathematicians involved: those
who were involved in these developments were fully aware, and on occasion quite
explicit, about their methodological and (broadly) philosophical preferences.
Many other mathematicians in Frege’s stream of mathematics also expressed the
opinion that something remarkable and quite novel was going on in mathematics
which demanded broader methodological clarification. This was in fact a reason-










 an astute – and not atypical – expression of one side of an ongoing
methodological debate. Here I’ll present just a slice of this background with
relevance to the Caesar problem, but even with the horizon so drastically narrowed




To appreciate the relevance of the material of this section to Frege’s mathematical
environment I’ll need to set down a few points that I develop and defend else-




a) Frege’s work in ‘ordinary’ (i.e. non-foundational) mathematics is con-
centrated in two areas: geometry and complex analysis.
b) German complex analysis at the time exhibited a sharp divide between
the ‘computational’ approach of Weierstrass in Berlin, and the ‘concep-
tual’ approach of Riemann late of Göttingen.
c) The adherents of the Riemann tradition included Frege’s teachers and
Dedekind. More generally, the evidence from Frege’s teaching, research
and context indicates that he was immersed in the Riemann tradition and
opposed to the principles driving the Weierstrass approach.
 
mathematical environment was substantial, I’m now inclined to feel I underestimated the rich-
ness of the background. In particular, in connection with the issues of disentangling geometry
and analysis, along with the concern about quantifier interaction and continuity-convergence
concerns, I would have devoted more time to the Dirichlet principle were I writing that paper




See Tappenden forthcoming a and b.
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d) Frege’s reading and teaching reveal that the small list of topics Frege
concentrated on in his complex analysis research included the theory of
elliptic functions (and the generalization to Abelian functions, though we
will not consider that here) and the theory of cyclotomic extensions
(‘circle division’). These two topics were in fact bound together in a
delicate way. These topics put stress on the issue of disentangling geom-
etry and arithmetic. Much of Dedekind’s most powerful mathematical
work was devoted to developing the theories of these, and more general




A particular feature of Riemann’s approach to complex function theory that is
relevant here is the way it understood the quest for the ‘right’ definition of key
functions and objects. Dedekind sums up the attitude vividly in the following
remarks, in which he represents his approach – moved by Riemann – as pushed
forward by an emphasis on ‘the internal rather than the external’:
 




]: ‘But neither [Waring nor
Wilson] was able to prove the theorem, and Waring confessed that the demonstration




In Tappenden 1995a I stressed the importance for Frege of the theme of disentangling
geometry and arithmetic, with special reference to the practice of geometry. As I’ve learned
more about Frege’s environment, I’ve learned that the point cuts even deeper with reference to
complex analysis. Indeed, a common piece of received wisdom about the nineteenth century
mathematics is not only wrong, but drastically so. One statement of the received wisdom occurs
in a recent introduction:
The attempt to clarify these notions (of limit, and continuity) involved arithmetizing
analysis, that is, showing that its truths could be proved from truths of arithmetic. By
the time Frege began his work, most proofs of analysis had been separated from
geometry and the notion of magnitude. It is not surprising, then, that it would have
seemed less evident to Frege that the truths of analysis are synthetic a priori (Weiner
2000, 19–20).
So far as complex, rather than real, analysis is concerned (this is remember, the kind of analysis





historical situation in a way that crucially misrepresents the relation between Frege’s foundations




 to Riemann’s work (which drew on Gauss’ earlier
geometric representation of complex numbers) complex analysis in Germany had been carried









 Riemann’s revolution in the 1850’s that complex
analysis, in the tradition Frege belonged to, became something different – immersed in intuitive
representations. During this period (which we may somewhat arbitrarily terminate with Weyl’s




 obvious that complex
analysis could be carried out independently of appeals to geometric facts than it had to previous
generations of mathematicians. In this domain, Weierstrass’ ‘arithmetization’ program – the








 – was a parochial and in some respects (such as the attitude to Riemann
surfaces) even somewhat hidebound stance for clinging to the old certainties in the face of a
completely novel style of mathematics. I discuss this point further in Tappenden forthcoming a
and b.
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prime number. But in our opinion truths of this kind ought to be drawn out of notions
not out of notations.’ In these last words lies, if they are taken in the most general
sense, the statement of a great scientific thought: the decision for the internal in
contrast to the external. This contrast also recurs in mathematics in almost all areas;
[For example] (complex) function theory, and Riemann’s definition of functions
through internal characteristic qualities, from which the external forms of represen-
tation flow with necessity [Dedekind continues, in paraphrase: The contrast also
comes up in ideal theory, and so I am trying here to put down a definitive formula-
tion] (Dedekind 1895, 54–55).
 
Of course, the philosophical question of how to distinguish ‘fundamental charac-
teristics’ that allow you to ‘predict the results of calculation’ from ‘forms of
representation which should be results, not tools, of the theory’ is complicated. But
in the specific cases at hand, particularly in Dedekind’s favored analogue, Rie-
mann’s complex function theory, the cash value of the contrast – in terms of known
examples – is easily established and it would have been transparent to his readers
what he was referring to. The point of contrast that we’re particularly concerned
with is: are objects of study to be introduced in a way that ties them to a specific
representation, or in a representation-independent way allowing indirect existence
proofs and the discussion of objects for which no description is available? In that
case, the choice was one of inestimable mathematical significance.
In section 3 we’ll further anchor the point in the philosophical issues familiar
to Frege scholars, by considering how Dedekind explicitly links the Riemann
methodology and orientation to definitions with his version of the ‘Caesar prob-
lem’, when he reformulates Kummer’s ideal theory in a representation–indepen-
dent way. As we’ll see, Dedekind uses just this charged language to motivate the
transition from what Frege would call ‘a concept’ to what he would call ‘an
object’.
It would be a distraction to compile a longer list of quotations in this vein:
suffice it to note (as I spell out elsewhere) that such expressions of opinion – in
these words or minor variants – were so common among those in the Riemann
stream as to reach the status of clichés. What sorts of reasons were given to justify
claims that some definition or other was based ‘on fundamental characteristics’





 could provide for such a claim were to be some kind of brute,
inarticulate and unarticulatable aesthetic response, as if ‘being the right definition’
were grounded in nothing more than ‘powerfully seeming to be the right defini-
tion’. In fact, the reasons were subtle and various. I’ll concentrate on just one
here: it was seen as evidence that a definition got things right if it was fruitful.
Riemann used a particular turn of phrase to make this point: he described the










). It was seen as a strength that by present-
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ing objects as Riemann did, a wide range of different perspectives became avail-
able. This sort of talk also became clichéd; to consider one example, even as late
as 1899 the author of a textbook on elliptic functions (based on Riemann’s earlier
lectures) characterizes the one strength of the Riemann approach as lying in:
 
. . . the synthetic treatment of analytic problems which 
 
builds up the expression for
the functions
 
 and integrals solely 
 






 from the given element and 
 
thereby guarantees a multi-
faceted view into the nature of the problem and the variety of its solutions
 
 (Stahl
1899, III emphasis mine).
 
These improvements in evidentness brought out by a proper definition were
expected to be systematic: the proper definition should make a range of interesting




 It is worth noting that the innovations regarded




 so regarded: it is
remarkable how much the basic shape of complex analysis and the relevant
domains of algebraic geometry today was laid in place by Riemann. The style of
thinking he helped introduce dominates contemporary mathematics.
To get a robust sense of the differences at issue between schools of complex
analysis in the nineteenth century, we’ll need some examples. One example (the
definition of analytic function) is simple but not all that deep, and the other (the
definition and study of elliptic function) is quite rich, but complicated enough that
I’ll only be able to point out a few highlights.
Weierstrass’ approach, in tune with his ‘arithmetization of analysis’, takes as
basic the definition of an 
 




 as a function that can be





























numbers. This is an infinite series, but it was important to Weierstrass that the
definition exploited only ‘elementary’ terms (addition, multiplication and (for-
mally defined) exponentiation). An important fact about this definition is that it
is intrinsically local: the series will typically converge only within some given
radius of convergence. Beyond that the series need not be defined. This is not as
much of a handicap as it might seem to be at first sight: in those cases where the
analytic function on a given open set extends to a multiple-valued function (‘mul-
tifunction’) on the entire complex plane, this continuation is unique. That is, every





 The key point for our purposes is that there is a specific




I might note in passing the interest of this kind of phenomenon for anyone who wants
to rest any weight on the idea of basic principles ‘being evident’. ‘Being evident’ is systemati-
cally dependent on the theoretical context and even the definitions of basic core ideas.
9 Note, though that a ‘multifunction’ is not a function, as this expression is defined in
elementary logic and calculus textbooks, since it assigns several values to one argument. To
assign unique values, the domain has to be unfolded into a Riemann surface.
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Riemann’s approach differs even in the definition of the object of study: the
details are less crucial here so they may be left for a footnote.10 The key point is
that Riemann’s definition did not refer to any explicit representation of a function
in terms of anything like a series. It was fundamental to his approach that the
existence of a given function could be proven, without a representation being
sought.
Despite the fact that the definitions are now known to be in some sense
interchangeable, the choice of one or the other as basic was regarded as a matter
of no little significance. For those in the Riemann school, it was his definition that
really cottoned on to the essential properties; the Weierstrass definition exploited
accidental forms of representation. Weierstrass objected to the Riemann definition
on the grounds that it rested on a primitive and (Weierstrass thought) uncontrolled
concept of function. In retrospect, the idea of function has become so central to
working mathematics that it is hard to fathom this reservation. I don’t think it
unreasonable to say that Riemann was just right about the concept of function,
and subsequent mathematical developments have made that plain.11 (Of course,
Frege’s view of the fundamental importance of the concept of function not only
for mathematics but for ‘conceptual thought’ is well-known.) There is more, but
this will perhaps be enough to make the point: even with quite simple definitions
that were largely interchangeable, deep reasons could be given for singling out
one of them as ‘fastening on the essential, internal characteristics’, and these
choices were bound up with deep features of ongoing research.
This was a point of concern for Weierstrass, who expressed misgivings about
this and related aspects of the Riemann approach in a letter:
10 For Riemann, the functions to be studied are those satisfying the so-called Cauchy-
Riemann conditions, which define complex differentiability in terms of (real) partial derivatives:
With z as the complex variable, and writing the real and imaginary parts of f as u and
v (so f(z) = u +iv), f is differentiable at (x,y) if these partial derivatives exist and these
relations hold:
These definitions are now known to be (with a couple of additional minor hypotheses)
equivalent. This was not known to be true at the time. Riemann himself, who was less rigorous
than most of the people – Dirichlet, Frege, Dedekind, Weierstrass – that we are discussing,
appeared to assume that any function satisfying the C-R equations at a point could be expanded
into a power series about that point, and hence that the function was analytic in Weierstrass’
sense (since the converse direction is trivial). I’m grateful to Howard Stein for bringing me to
appreciate this. However, Weierstrass, as well as Riemann students like Dedekind, were less
sanguine about such things.
11 There is more to say about the role of indirect function existence arguments as a key
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At first the purpose of these lectures was to properly determine the concept of
analytic dependence; to this there attached itself the problem of obtaining the
analytic forms in which functions with definite properties can be represented . . . for
the representation of a function is most intimately linked with the investigation of
its properties, even though it may be interesting and useful to find properties of the
function without paying attention to its representation. The ultimate aim is always
the representation of a function (Weierstrass 1886/1988, 156, emphasis in
original).12
The contrast at issue can be nicely illustrated by elliptic functions, so it’s time to
say what these are. ‘Elliptic functions’ were originally introduced as the inverse
of certain kinds of integral. Later it was discovered that elliptic functions have
two periods. That is, if F is an elliptic function, there will be complex numbers
w1 and w2 such that for any complex z, and any integers m and n, F(z) = F(z +
mw1 + nw2). Later still, it was recognized that this is a reasonable choice as a
defining feature of such functions, while the original definition in terms of the
inverse of an integral, though equivalent, is better seen as accidental. Reflecting
this, most textbooks today define ‘elliptic function’ as a (meromorphic) complex
function with this characteristic property.
To approach individual elliptic functions, there is a characteristically Weier-
strassian way to go and many characteristically Riemannian ways, among which
one is especially handy for illustration here. The Weierstrassian way comes up
with a universal scheme for representing elliptic functions in terms of a specific
family of series (Weierstrass -functions). The Riemann way observes that when
you know a few basic facts about the values of an elliptic functions (the places
where it is zero, the places where it is infinite (poles), and (loosely speaking) the
number of times each of the zeros and poles are to be counted (the orders of the
zeros and poles)) then you’ve determined the function up to a constant, which
from a mathematical point of view is to determine it uniquely. With this result in
hand, plus others indicating that if you know about zeros and poles you know
much of what you need to know, the Riemannian can take the zeros, poles and
their orders to be a determining property of a given elliptic function, with a
representation developed later, only if needed. Here again we have an illustration
of a fundamental Riemannian methodological stance: rather than take it as given
at the outset what the basic concepts should be (in the way that Weierstrass took
it as given at the outset that a reduction to ‘elementary terms’ was a reduction to
the traditional standbys like plus and times) Riemann regarded the question of
what should count as basic as itself something that was to be discovered in the
course of research. One criterion for deciding if the proper basic concepts had
been identified was the assumption that the correct choice of basic concepts would
12 I have taken the translation from Shenitzer’s translation in Laugwitz 1999.
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yield fruitful characterizations that allowed one to see ‘practically without com-
puting’ previously obscure results.13
As Dedekind sees it, Riemann showed in his treatment of complex functions
that there is a great mathematical advantage to be gained by defining the objects
of study in a representation–independent way. Dedekind put this attitude into
practice in profound work in function theory; for example in his 1877 treatment
of elliptic modular functions he exploits Riemannian methods to powerful effect.
He was consciously putting into practice the broader methodological stance. As
he puts it in a letter to Lipschitz in 1876:14
My efforts in number theory have been directed toward basing the work not on
arbitrary representations or expressions but on simple foundational concepts and
thereby – although the comparison may sound a bit grandiose – to achieve in number
theory something analogous to what Riemann achieved in function theory, in which
connection I cannot suppress the passing remark that Riemann’s principles are not
being adhered to in a significant way by most writers – for example even in the
newest works on elliptic functions. Almost always they mar the purity of the theory
by unnecessarily bringing in forms of representation which should be results, not
tools, of the theory (Dedekind 1876a, 468–469).
In the next section we’ll see how Dedekind approaches the definitions of objects
in number theory in this representation-independent way. There are two more
points I need to mention before moving on. First of all, a point that will be too
complicated to develop here but which should be mentioned is touched on in the
remarks quoted above from Stahl’s textbook, to the effect that in Riemann’s
approach one gains a ‘multifaceted view’ of the problem. For the sake of space,
I’ve omitted a crucial feature of Riemann’s approach to analytic functions. Rather
than functions defined on the complex plane they are reinterpreted as functions
on the ‘natural’ surfaces (‘Riemann surfaces’). The properties of these surfaces
reflect key properties of elliptic functions and generalizations (Abelian functions).
One side effect of this approach is the number of different routes by which the
theory can be investigated: as a geometrically presented theory of complex func-
tions (Klein etc.), as an algebraic theory of curves and surfaces (Clebsch etc.; in
an old-fashioned algorithmic sense of ‘algebraic’), as a unified algebraic theory
of function fields and number fields capturing the algebraic structure of such
surfaces and functions on them (Dedekind, in the contemporary ‘structural’ sense
of ‘algebraic’), as what we would now call a topological theory (much contem-
porary work) and many others. The theory can even be reconstructed within the
Weierstrass approach, as Klein and Hermann Weyl (in the early part of the
13 Here too there is more than I can include in a single paper: in particular the role of
topology in Riemann’s characterization of elliptic functions illustrates deep points about math-
ematical method. I discuss this further in Tappenden in preparation c.
14 This letter was brought to my attention by Edwards 1987, 14. I’ve also taken the
translation from that article.
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twentieth century) were at pains to spell out. There are many other ways that
appeared in the twentieth century; I’ve listed a few of the more prominent
approaches that were recognized at the time.
The situation is reminiscent of the well-known developments of about the same
time in which arguments for the existence of atoms were based on the fact that
several different kinds of phenomena (Avogadro’s number, Brownian motion, etc.)
all pointed to the existence of atoms. (Of course, since the facts in the mathemat-
ical case don’t have the contingency of those in the empirical case, the analogy
is only partial.) Here there are a range of seemingly drastically different mathe-
matical theories that support the same definitions and results. That this was an
important and novel development, characteristic of the stream of mathematical
research Frege inhabited, should be borne in mind when reading his remarks about
the importance, for extending knowledge, of the possibility of recognizing an
object as the same under a different guise. The possibility of learning about
mathematical objects through widely varied channels of information also adds a
recognizable sense to the idea of logical objects as ‘self-subsistent’ and autono-
mous in some sense that resembles the autonomy of physical objects. This kind
of autonomy is provided by giving the object about which one can theorize rather
than symbols to manipulate.
A final point that needs emphasis is that Riemann’s techniques often require
defining functions more broadly than might otherwise seem necessary. The point
is that he systematically exploited interactions between the properties of a domain
‘in the small’ and ‘in the large’, so that even in cases where it would appear that
only the local facts about objects in a domain were at issue, there was a need to
be clear on the facts about the entire domain as a collective. (In contemporary
mathematics local-global interaction is a standard pattern, but at the time it was
a Riemannian novelty.) I’ll give one example to illustrate the point about local
and global interaction; I’ll also restrict attention just to how this example illus-
trates local and global interaction, leaving to another time the exploration of
additional ramifications of this example in connection to Frege.
A core result in the development of Riemannian analysis is the Riemann
mapping theorem.15 First a definition: A conformal mapping is a mapping that
preserves oriented angles between lines intersecting at a point. With this definition
in hand we can state the theorem:
15 For a clear, historically sensitive discussion of the theorem from a contemporary
perspective a good place to turn is Remmert 1991, ch. 8. Walsh 1973 contains an exceptionally
clear discussion, which brings out nicely the connection between the original arguments for the
Riemann mapping theorem and the Dirichlet principle. A more rigorous and detailed (also more
advanced and difficult) exploration of these connections is in Siegel 1969, ch. 2 especially §6–
§9. As with many other topics, I owe a debt here to the work of Gray, in this case his 1994.
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Given any simply connected plane region S (alternately: a plane region S bounded
by a simple closed curve) there is a conformal mapping taking S onto the interior
of the unit circle. (i.e.: the disc {z | |z| < 1}).16
Among the interesting things about this result is that to prove it, Riemann invoked
a controversial principle – the ‘Dirichlet principle’ – whose history also forms an
important backdrop to Frege’s work.17,18 But I’ll leave that for elsewhere. Here we
should just note that the theorem states a delicate relationship between a global
property – i.e. a property of the region as a whole (what we would now call the
topology of the region) and a local property (i.e. a property that makes sense in
an arbitrarily small neighborhood of a given point): the preservation of directed
angles at a point. This is more than just a surprising result: it is, and was recog-
nized as, a harbinger of an entirely new vision of what mathematics can be.
(Indeed, much of contemporary mathematics has played out successively more
sophisticated variations on this theme.) The key point for our purposes is the
observation that the study of apparently narrowly delineated phenomena like
angles at a point may require information not just about every other point in the
region but even about properties of the collective. This puts pressure toward
defining properties more globally than might appear to be required at first sight.
I take up another illustrative example – Riemann’s treatment of the zeta-function
– in the appendix.
3. Dedekind’s ‘ideals’ and the ‘Caesar Problem’: (A hidden subtext to 
Grundlagen)
So far we’ve looked at a few related themes from Grundlagen, centering about
the Caesar problem, plus some aspects of Frege’s mathematical environment that
have at least a superficial affinity with some aspects of the Caesar problem. But
how close would the affinity have seemed to Frege and his mathematically
informed readers? To bring out that the answer is ‘very close indeed’ it will be
16 To understand the point it isn’t necessary to know what ‘simply connected’ means.
It suffices to know that it is a property of the region as a whole.
17 The use of the Dirichlet principle to prove the existence of functions required for the
Riemann mapping theorem is one of the most salient illustrations of the point mentioned in
footnote 7: in complex analysis after 1850 it became unclear to what extent geometry and
complex analysis could be untangled. The principle is obvious for simple geometric and physical
situations and false in a natural abstract formulation. It was not till the turn of the century that
Hilbert came up with a non-geometric version that was both provable and capable of doing the
work required of it.
18 Another point is worth noting (for further details see Tappenden forthcoming b). An
expression Frege uses in Grundlagen, to the effect that by providing rigorous proofs one can
establish the ‘limits to the validity’ of a proposition, was also a widely dispersed catchphrase
in the late nineteenth century. It showed up in many different areas, but it was especially common
in discussions of prospective proofs of the Dirichlet principle.
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helpful to walk through Dedekind’s definition of ideal numbers. Dedekind
approaches the topic in a way that is remarkably similar to Frege’s discussions in
Grundlagen, and as we’ve already noted, Dedekind is explicit about the Rieman-
nian motives for the particular moves he makes. In particular, Dedekind lays out
explicitly that the motivation for his representation–independent presentations is
his desire to emulate the methodology incorporated into Riemannian complex
analysis.
I’ll need some quick background. I’ll just wave my hands at crucial points.
(Since these developments are exceptionally well covered in the secondary liter-
ature, I’m able to restrict attention to just what we need here, with footnote
pointers for those who are thirsty for more.)19 In the early nineteenth century, a
famous fallacious attempt to prove the Fermat theorem failed because the argu-
ment assumed falsely that the numbers in a field extending the integers would
each have a unique decomposition into prime factors. To give an argument that
would compensate for the loss of this property, the first thing that was done was
to conceptually split the familiar concept of prime number into two properties
that coincide on the integers but not in general: a number n is irreducible if its
only factors are 1 and n itself, and a number n is prime if whenever n divides a
product ab then n divides a or n divides b. Kummer then set out to consider the
structures resulting from extending the integers with cyclotomic integers: pos-
ited solutions to equations xn = 1 for n a positive integer.20 It would be
extremely convenient if cyclotomic integers could be counted on to break down
into prime factors. But they can’t. Kummer’s response can be summed up sim-
ply: well, then let’s just postulate that there are such factors, and continue as if
nothing happened. Of course, it can’t be quite that easy: the postulation has to
be subject to rules that will keep problems from occurring. The difference
between Kummer and Dedekind lies in the shape these rules take: Kummer
gives rules that describe how something can be multiplied and manipulated if it
is given as an ideal prime factor, while Dedekind actually tells you what these
factors are.
19 Any examination of the topic must begin with the detailed work of Edwards 1975;
1977; 1977a; 1980 and 1987. (This recommendation shouldn’t be construed as an acceptance
of all of Edwards’ methodological obiter dicta concerning the allegedly negligible mathematical
power of Dedekind’s change of perspective. Ferrierós 1999 has some useful counterbalancing
demurrals on various points. He refers to a forthcoming scholarly treatment by Haubrich which
appears likely to work as a further counterweight to Edwards’ analysis.) Also helpful is
Bashmakova and Rudakov 1992, 99–108 and 116–125, especially on the local character of
Kummer’s method.
20 Kummer actually explored more general extensions; cyclotomic extensions provide
a special case that suffices for our purposes.
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I’ll unfold Kummer’s approach in connection with a specific example from
the cyclotomic integers, though the problems are much more general.21,22 Consider
the cyclotomic integers resulting from adding the 23 roots of x23 = 1.23 In this
domain, 47 has no prime factors, and so the results that could otherwise be
obtained by exploiting the existence of a prime decomposition are unavailable.
The general features of these cyclotomic integers tell us to expect 22 distinct ideal
prime factors. Not to worry: let’s just posit such factors, obtaining an extended
system containing the cyclotomic integers and in which 47 does have a decom-
position into prime factors. What are these numbers, and why should we believe
that there are any? Well, that is a tricky question. As mentioned, Kummer gives
rules to tell us how to multiply numbers if they are given as ideal numbers, and
he tells us how to see when something given as an ideal number is divisible by
another. But we don’t actually get a definition. Hence, after introducing Kummer’s
idea, Dedekind registers this complaint:24
. . . the efforts of Kummer [were] finally rewarded by a truly great and fruitful
(féconde) discovery . . . [By introducing] ideal prime factors, whose effect is only
apparent when they are combined together, he obtained the surprising result that the
21 I am brushing by one complication that arises in the general case: the problem of
identifying what should count as the integers in the general fields extending the rational numbers.
(Edwards 1980 and 1987 puts especially strong emphasis on the mathematical need for a solution
to this analytical problem of identifying the properties of integers in general number fields. See
also Bashmakova and Rudakov 1992, 106–108) Though I won’t be addressing this topic here,
but it is worth mentioning as a check against oversimplification, as one more example of the
kind of background problem that gave mathematical point to Frege’s questions like ‘What is a
number?’ and ‘What is the number one?’
22 I take this example from Edwards 1980, 324–328. Readers who are interested in more
specific details (Where did that 47 come from? etc.) can find them there.
23 The example is not arbitrary. Uniqueness of prime decomposition holds for the
cyclotomic integers for xl = with l < 23.
24 Dedekind’s characterization of ideal prime factors as having an effect ‘that is only
apparent when they are combined together’ indicates a point of connection to Frege’s works that
should be noted, though I’m not sure it leads anywhere. The idea that an ideal prime factors is
like a radical in chemistry, to be understood in terms of its contribution to compounds, was
explicitly stated by Kummer. The remarks were quoted explicitly in Hankel [1867], a book Frege
repeatedly cites. This is worth keeping in mind in connection with Frege’s ubiquitous chemical
metaphors about the ‘unsaturatedness’ of concepts. (It is especially worth remembering because,
as noted in the text, Dedekind’s complaint against Kummer is identical to Frege’s complaint
against ‘formalists’ at the end of Grundlagen, though Frege presents it as a point about the
confusion of concept and object.) Here is a sample of the Kummer remarks quoted by Hankel.
(In the sentences surrounding this passage, Hankel mentions other work which attempts to
exploit a perceived algebra/chemistry affinity, but none of it caught on.)
Chemical combination corresponds to the multiplication of the complex numbers; the
elements, or actually their atomic weights correspond to the prime factors; and the chemical
formulae for the decomposition of bodies are exactly the same as those for the decomposition of
numbers. We even find the ideal numbers of our theory in chemistry . . . as hypothetical radicals,
which have their actuality in compounds (Kummer 1847a, 360, cited in Hankel, 1867, 104).
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laws of divisibility in those numerical domains studied by him were now in complete
agreement with those that govern the domain of rational integers.
. . . Kummer did not define ideal numbers themselves, but only the divisibility of













 is divisible by an ideal number correspond-
ing to the property A. While this introduction of new numbers is entirely legitimate,
it is nevertheless to be feared at first that the language which speaks of ideal numbers
being determined by their products . . . may lead to hasty conclusions and incom-





1996, 57 italics in original).
 
Some years later, when setting out to provide a finished treatment of this topic,
Dedekind reemphasizes the importance of the representation–independent char-
acter of an acceptable definition. In this quote, Dedekind has just presented a
theory of divisibility of ideals in Kummer style that he regards as not wholly
inadequate, but which he nonetheless rejects. He motivates his shift using trans-
parent allusions to Riemannian methods, using the by now familiar catchphrases:
 
One notices, in fact, that the proofs of the most important propositions depend on
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 . . . If we want to treat fields of
arbitrary degree in the same way, then we shall run into great difficulties, perhaps
insurmountable ones. Even if there were such a theory, based on calculation, it still
would not be of the highest degree of perfection, in my opinion. 
 
It is preferable, as
in the modern theory of [complex] functions to seek proofs based immediately on
fundamental characteristics, rather than on calculation
 
, and indeed to construct the
theory in such a way that it is able 
 
to predict the results of calculation
 
 . . . Such is
the goal I shall pursue in the chapters of this memoir that follow. (Dedekind 1877/




In Kummer’s treatment, the rules for manipulating an ideal number are inescap-
ably bound to its initial symbolic presentation. Kummer defined ideal numbers
by giving an algorithm for computing with them. Dedekind complains that this
tells you how to compute – add, divide, multiply – two objects if the two objects









? What then? Dedekind’s two cited reasons for avoiding the computational
option are of interestingly different kinds. On one hand, he indicates a quite
tangible methodological reason to prefer the less computational approach: the
algorithmic method doesn’t generalize to natural cognate cases. (The technique




Dedekind is alluding to the fact that Kummer made some mistakes, and that these
mistakes appear to have arisen from Kummer being misled by his mode of expression into




A remark of Hilbert’s describing a much later reworking of this material is also worth
noting here: ‘I have tried to avoid Kummer’s elaborate computational machinery so that here
too Riemann’s principle may be realized and the proofs compelled not by calculations but by
thought alone’ (Hilbert 1897/1998).
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higher degrees.) The other point goes to the heart of the value of Dedekind’s
understanding of the Riemann ‘conceptual’ style, and is once again expressed in
familiar clichés: by formulating the problem in the right way we gain a fruitful
formulation that will allow us to confidently ‘predict the results of computation’.
This is not just public relations puffery on Dedekind’s part – his objective guides,
and is largely attained by the impressive mathematical achievement that these
words inaugurate.
So now that we know what Dedekind wants to do and why, how does he do it?
Anyone familiar with Frege’s treatment of the Caesar question will have a
distinct sense of déjà vu: present an object – the ideal – independently of the
representation by taking it to be the set of all the numbers it divides27:
. . . Since a characteristic property serves to define, not an ideal number, itself, but
only the divisibility of the numbers in o by the ideal number, one is naturally led to
consider the set a of all numbers a of the domain o which are divisible by a particular
ideal number. I call such a system an ideal for short, so that to each particular ideal
number there corresponds a particular ideal a (Dedekind 1877/1996, 58 italics in
original).
Dedekind, like Frege, stresses the importance of fruitfulness as a guide to scien-
tifically important concepts. Note, for example that one of his more famous
remarks, taken generally to define his philosophical stance, is followed by remarks
that tie the point into the ones we have been discussing, and it invokes a lecture
that makes even more explicitly the general point that fruitfulness of novel con-
cepts is a driving mathematical concern:
From just this point of view it appears as something self-evident and not new that
every theorem of algebra and higher analysis, no matter how remote, can be
expressed as a theorem about natural numbers – a declaration I have heard repeatedly
from the lips of Dirichlet. But I see nothing meritorious – and this was just as far
from Dirichlet’s thought – in actually performing this wearisome circumlocution
and insisting on the use and recognition of no other than rational numbers. On the
contrary, the greatest and most fruitful advances in mathematics and other sciences
have invariably been made by the creation and introduction of new concepts, ren-
dered necessary by the frequent recurrence of complex phenomena which could be
controlled by the old notions only with difficulty. On this subject I gave a lecture
[Dedekind 1854] . . . but this is not the place to go into further detail (Dedekind
1888/1901, 35–36).
27 Mark Wilson, in his 1999, 248–249 claims that Dedekind supplements his introduc-
tion of ideals with a further act of ‘erasing’ the set–theoretic structure: ‘Dedekind always insisted
that the “real” factor was obtained from erasing unwanted structure from the set ideal, although
this gloss is usually ignored nowadays’ (249). This doesn’t seem to be true. Wilson presumably
has in mind Dedekind’s famous appeal to abstraction in his definition of the natural numbers in
Dedekind 1888/1901. That seems to be a specific restriction Dedekind places on certain systems
of which we have an antecedent conception. Dedekind doesn’t do any ‘erasing’ with ideals in
the canonical presentations of the theory like his 1877/1996. (Wilson gives no references for
any of his attributions so it is hard to be sure what parts of Dedekind he is referring to.)
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The cited lecture of 1854 – Dedekind’s habilitation lecture in front of Gauss and
a few others – was devoted to exploring the principles informing the reasonable
introduction of new concepts.28 In that essay we find remarks reminiscent of the
Frege’s words concerning fruitfulness as ‘the acid test of concepts’. For example,
Dedekind remarks – in connection with a hypothetical mineralogist who rejects
color as a basis for classification, preferring crystalline structure or chemical
composition: ‘The introduction of such a concept as a motif for the arrangement
of the system is, as it were, a hypothesis which one puts to the inner nature of the
science; only in further development does the science answer; the greater or lesser
effectiveness of a concept determines its worth or worthlessness’ (Dedekind 1854/
1996, 756). Toward the end of the article, he indicates that the patterns for
identification of the most valuable concepts and functions in mathematics are
becoming even more complicated, with distinctive novel patterns emerging and
continuing to unfold in the theory of elliptic functions (761), presumably referring
to the Riemann lectures he was attending at the time. This was prescient; as we’ve
noted, research into elliptic functions (and more generally into functions of a
complex variable including the cognate topics of elliptic integrals, Abelian func-
tions, and Abelian integrals) would be at the center of a spectacular reorientation
of large areas of mathematics in the coming forty years, within which the broad
issues of Dedekind 1854 would be pushed to unexpected depths. Furthermore –
though to pursue this point would take us far afield – the study of elliptic functions
interacted with the study of cyclotomic integers in unexpectedly deep ways. This
was shown not just in meta-level philosophical reflection on mathematics but,
more importantly, was incorporated within the innovations that drove several
streams of ongoing mathematical practice.
There is a further connection between Dedekind’s approach to ideals and
Frege’s rationale for his definition of number that is worth making explicit: in
Grundlagen (though not later) Frege makes some critical remarks about ‘formal-
ists’ that would apply straightforwardly to Kummer’s introduction of ideal factors
by (as Dedekind puts it) ‘characteristic properties’. The point has to be crafted
with care because in Grundlagen – though not in [FTA] or Grundgesetze II –
Frege’s use of ‘formal’ (formal) (which is today tendentiously translated ‘formal-
ist’) is ambiguous between the view that mathematical objects are signs and a
view that we wouldn’t call ‘formalist’ today, that mathematical objects can be
introduced through implicit definition by sets of conditions. In later writings,
28 Frege most likely never saw Dedekind 1854, as it remained unpublished until volume
III of Dedekind’s collected works appeared in 1930. It’s not inconceivable that Frege might have
somehow obtained a copy of the lecture but lacking any evidence to this effect, the default
assumption is surely that he didn’t. Frege did read Dedekind 1888, and in fact devoted a session
of his mathematics seminar to studying it; but it came out too late to influence anything in
Grundlagen of 1884. Dedekind 1877 appeared in French; it is however, a variation on Dedekind
1879, which Frege would have had easy access to and almost surely did read.
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‘formalist’ is an appropriate translation, as ‘formal’ is used more narrowly to mean
only the view that mathematical objects are signs.29 It is important to be clear on
this, as the remarks about ‘formal’ theories in Grundlagen are often misread by
projecting later discussions back on to them.
Frege connects his critique of ‘formal theories’ to one of his ‘three fundamen-
tal principles’: ‘never to lose sight of the distinction between concept and object’
([FA]):
As to the [distinguish concept and object] point, it is a mere illusion to suppose that
a concept can be made an object without altering it. From this it follows that a widely
held formal theory of fractional, negative, etc. numbers is untenable ([FA])
(emphasis mine).
Toward the end of Grundlagen Frege revisits the point in a critical discussion of
Hankel (§92–§99). He notes that some sets of conditions cannot be satisfied, and
so to assume they can be satisfied would generate a false result. Again, the concept
– object distinction is invoked:
This is the error that infects the formal theory of fractions and of negative and
complex numbers [Footnote: Cantor’s infinite numbers are in like case.] It is postu-
lated that the well-known rules of calculation shall still hold, where possible, for the
newly introduced numbers, and from these their general properties and relations are
deduced. If no contradiction is anywhere encountered, the introduction of the new
numbers is held to be justified, as though it were impossible for a contradiction still
to be lurking somewhere nontheless, and as though freedom from contradiction
amounted straightaway to existence.
§97 That this mistake is so easily made is due, of course, to the failure to distinguish
concepts and objects ([FA] 108).
Frege’s arguments in this section are completely general: they apply to any effort
to introduce objects just by listing conditions, not just those which involve the
stance that mathematical objects are signs. Though Frege doesn’t mention Kum-
mer or ideal factors here, reference to them is presumably included in the broad
sweep of his discussion of theories of complex numbers. Indeed, in Grundgesetze
II (§144) and the essay on Schubert’s numbers ([SN] 264), Frege uses the intro-
duction of primitive roots as illustrations in arguments that are identical to the
Grundlagen arguments under discussion here. (Frege notes archly in [SN] that
when Gauss addressed this kind of question in connection with the Gaussian
29 In subsequent writings [FTA] and Grundgesetze II, ‘formal’ is applied consistently
and exclusively to the ‘mathematical objects are signs’ view. One tangible reflection of Frege’s
changed usage is that in Grundlagen Frege counts Hankel’s work and Cantor’s introduction of
infinite numbers as examples of ‘formal theories’ (formale Theorien). In Grundgesetze II (§ 145)
he explicitly distinguishes uses of ‘formal’, and states that Cantor is not a formalist in the
‘mathematical objects are signs’ sense, adding that Hankel is an unclear case because he didn’t
clearly distinguish sign and signified. To reflect this, I am translating “formal” in Grundlagen
with the neutral “formal” rather than ‘formalist’, which is today loaded with overtones of the
‘numbers are signs’ view.
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integers he proved the existence of the primitive roots he posited.) This suggests
strongly that pre-Dedekindian introductions of ideal factors are among those
definitions that are counted as confusing concept and object. And though Frege
doesn’t mention it, Dedekind’s definition of ideals was one that did get things
right as far as the concept-object distinction is concerned.
We should take stock here of just what Frege’s contribution was in all this.
The idea that objects should be introduced in a representation–independent way
and that this imperative arose in part from a fact about the way that mathematical
reasoning proves most fruitful was already in place in Dedekind’s rigorous appli-
cation of Riemann’s methods in connection with generalized numbers. The idea
that the ideal method demands global as opposed to local definitions was also in
the air in Frege’s environment. Since these were traceable back to the principles
informing Riemann’s complex analysis (and its prehistory in Gauss’ musings),
there was a compelling rationale available for the claim that these were method-
ological principles that would support fruitful research.
Of course, it is one thing to distinguish informally, as Dedekind does, between
‘functions given by inner characteristics’ and the subsequently derived features of
‘external forms of representation’. It is another to make clear sense of what this sort
of thing means. Frege’s distinctive contribution was to produce a deep logical
analysis and philosophical rationale for this Riemannian perspective. Say it is
granted that a powerful mathematical advantage is gained by introducing the object
of study as a ‘self-subsistent’ object rather than as tied to some representation. It
isn’t unreasonable to ask just what it means to say you’ve introduced something in
a representation independent way. What is the logical structure underlying such a
transition? If we are to take a primitive concept of function and rely extensively on
non-constructive function existence arguments, someone has to spell out what the
logic of function existence arguments is. And just when is an object introduced in a
representation-independent way? What principles – logical or otherwise – govern
the successful, representation-independent introduction of an object? It is possible
to debate just how much was ultimately added to the mathematical situation by
specific details of Frege’s logical analysis. I will leave this question for elsewhere.
But we should be clear, when evaluating Frege’s remarks on the general method-
ological objectives of his work, that he can be taken to be laying out the logical basis
of a true mathematical revolution whose nature had not yet been completely
understood, and would not be fully understood for many years to come.
Appendix: Broad and narrow definitions revisited: Did Frege 
change horses in Midstream?
Another example that illustrates the Riemannian preference for broader rather than
narrower definitions is best considered in an appendix, since it also allows us to
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address a separate puzzle. When Frege laid out the definition with Hume’s prin-
ciple, he appears to have done everything he needed for the subsequent develop-
ment of arithmetic in Grundgesetze. The subsequent definition, crafted to address
the Caesar problem, seems mathematically idle. In Frege’s formal derivations the
‘official’ definition is used only to derive the Hume’s principle definition Frege
set aside, and the Hume’s principle definition does all the subsequent work. It has
even been suggested (as we’ll see in a moment) that Frege simply changed his
mind while writing Grundlagen and the shift from one definition to another
reflects this. This example will help ease the sense of oddness that prompts such
suggestions. In Riemann’s treatment of the zeta function we’ll find a broad
definition given in a case where an already familiar narrow definition seems to do
most of the work. (It isn’t so broad as to decide the value of the zeta function on
Julius Caesar, of course, but even on a less than maximally global scale it illus-
trates the pattern we need.)
There is a crucial difference in the Riemann and Weierstrass approaches in
connection with definitions. Weierstrass’ style of definition was local and piece-
meal while, as noted, Riemann sought simple, global definitions that allow us to
exploit global properties.30 Weierstrass’ approach was to some extent a straight-
forward consequence of his techniques of ‘arithmetization’ and the correlated
attitude that ‘the ultimate aim is the representation of a function’. To obtain a
function over the entire complex plane, the function is often patched together
through analytic continuations: a sequence of functions defined on a chain of
discs, with each local function defined on the corresponding disc by a complex
power series converging on that disc.31
In the watershed paper Riemann 1859/1974 Riemann attacks the question of
the distribution of prime numbers by first giving a global definition of the z-
function. This function was well-known to be relevant to the distribution of
primes, but the function had only a partial definition. It was given by a series:
30 I am indebted to Edwards 1974, 9–13 and passim for drawing my attention to this
feature of Riemann’s approach and to the contrast with Weierstrass. Edwards sums up the
relevant methodological contrast succinctly:
. . . Riemann does not speak of the ‘analytic continuation’ of the function S•i=11/ns
beyond the halfplane Re s > 1 but speaks rather of finding a formula for it which
‘remains valid for all s’. This indicates that he [sought a single global extension rather
than] a piece – by – piece extension of the function in the manner that analytic
continuation is customarily taught today. The view of analytic continuation in terms of
chains of discs and power series convergent in each disc descends from Weierstrass and
is quite antithetical to Riemann’s basic philosophy that analytic functions should be
dealt with globally, not locally in terms of power series (Edwards 1974, 9).
31 Though analytic continuation is most commonly associated with Weierstrass because
of the importance it played in his general approach, the fact of the uniqueness of analytic
continuations was known to Riemann too, and he used the fact when it was helpful. The point
is taken up in Neuenschwander 1980.
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z(s) = S•i=11/ns, which converges for complex numbers with real part greater than
1 and diverges elsewhere. A key equivalence, known to Euler (the ‘Euler product
formula’), also holds only in this restricted domain:
From the first paragraph, Riemann 1859 shows itself to be engaged, in practice,
with themes to which Frege later gave theoretical expression. Riemann explicitly
crafts his definition of the zeta – function with an eye to ensure the definition was
‘always valid’ (immer gültig) over the entire complex plane (except at one pole
where it is known to be undefined), eschewing repeated analytic continuations via
power series in favor of a single, global definition that settles all (but one) of the
complex cases at a stroke:
The product formula is a special case, restricted to the domain in which the series
S•i=11/ni converges. To appreciate what is at stake here, it is important to recognize
that it is possible to continue to do analytic number theory just in terms of the
product formula, leaving the global definition aside.32 It was not clear at the
beginning just how much of a difference, if any, the global definition would
make.33 Neither in Riemann’s original paper nor in any subsequent discussions
was the desire for a general definition seen as incompatible with the idea that at
least for a large range of key questions, the restricted definition captured the
essential heart of the general definition.
Of course, there is a difference of degree in the Frege and Riemann
approaches: Frege’s concern with full determinacy of defined expressions (Julius
Caesar, the moon, . . .) – and his conception of this as bound up with the possibility
of formulating and applying logical laws – exceeds anything I have found in
Riemann. Riemann was not at all concerned with the values of functions on
arguments like ‘Julius Caesar’ or ‘the moon’. But Frege’s approach can be seen
as a more general version of Riemann’s, that has Riemann’s as a special case. The
crucial points here are these: a) The emphasis Frege places on total definition of
32 To locate the point in Frege’s environment, consider the habilitation thesis of Frege’s
Jena colleague Adolf Piltz, (Piltz 1884) addressed the distribution of primes using the zeta –
function, and almost all the work in the thesis was done by one of the series forms or the Euler
product formula. Riemann 1859 is mentioned approvingly, but the global definition of the zeta
function is absent.
33 For what it is worth, this opinion is still espoused, for example in Patterson 1988, 1)
who remarks that the Euler product formula is ‘the reason for the importance of the zeta-
function’.
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functions and the avoidance of piecemeal procedures of definition was not math-
ematically inert. It would have favored one mode of proceeding – Riemann’s –
over another – Weierstrass’ – in work that was sufficiently renowned, particularly
in Göttingen – that Frege was certain to be familiar with it; b) The position that
would result from adopting Frege’s strictures stands in opposition to the procedure
exploited in Weierstrass’ ‘arithmetization of analysis’.34 c) Finally, the affinity
between Riemann’s innovation and Frege’s definition of number appears against
the background of more broadly philosophical similarities concerning the value
of mathematical innovations, particularly as this aspect of Riemann’s approach is
interpreted by Dedekind.
This helps to set several otherwise puzzling features of Frege’s practice in a
different light. As noted, it has been taken to be a puzzle why Frege should bother
with the Caesar detour at all, given that from the point of view of the logical work
he wants to do, it seems that everything he needs is given by the Hume’s principle
definition he considers and rejects. The theorems of arithmetic derived in
Grundgesetze could have been derived from the system resulting from replacing
basic law V with Hume’s principle. Frege couldn’t have failed to be aware of this,
since his only essential application, in Grundgesetze, of his final, ‘official’ defi-
nition of number is to use it to prove the Hume principle, which then does nearly
all of the work. Some commentators have even posited that Frege changed his
mind abruptly in the middle of composing the book. (‘[P]ulled a switcheroo
without adequately informing his readers of the shift’ in the words of Wilson 1999,
258)35 Wilson proposes a speculative reconstruction of an overall change of mind
that might have prompted the perceived shift. Setting aside the question of the
likelihood of the reconstruction (though I do find it unconvincing), I don’t think
there is anything that needs to be explained. Frege first spells out the equivalence
that does much of the subsequent work, but which is not defined in general, and
then gives a definition which has full generality. This is just what Riemann did in
observing the importance of the series representation of the zeta-function, and
especially of the Euler product formula, despite the fact that these two functions
are defined only on complex numbers whose real part is greater than one. He gives
a more general definition (undefined only at one point), much of whose main work
is still done by the restricted parts. (Similar things could be said of the Dedekind
definition of ideals in relation to Kummer’s algorithms.) So I don’t see that Frege
or his audience would have held there to be anything at all out of the ordinary
about Frege’s double definition approach in Grundlagen. As high-profile examples
34 Note that here too a practical issue runs parallel with the theoretical one. In this
particular case of the zeta-function the power series representation turns out to be useless in
practice (according to Laugwitz 1999, 84).
35 See also Sluga 1980, 127 who makes a similar suggestion (though without the
imputation of dishonesty to Frege).
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around Frege exemplified, sometimes it just turns out that you need one ‘official’
definition to be global and another, restricted one to haul the water.
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